The Source of Liability in Indemnity and Contribution by Kull, Andrew
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-2003
The Source of Liability in Indemnity and
Contribution
Andrew Kull
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew Kull, The Source of Liability in Indemnity and Contribution, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 927 (2003).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol36/iss2/12
THE SOURCE OF LIABILITY IN INDEMNITY
AND CONTRIBUTION
Andrew Kull*
When A, having paid a judgment to B, obtains indemnity or
contribution from C, what is the source of C's liability to A? The
inquiry is not purely a matter of academic interest-though it offers
quite a lot of that-because it will sometimes determine whether the
remedy is available. The question is no longer asked very often, but
it still has a standard answer. Except when it is based on a contract,
express or implied-in-fact, liability for indemnity or contribution is
usually described as a species of restitution based on unjust
enrichment.1 The idea is that A has been compelled to pay C's debt,
or to contribute more than his own share of the parties' common
liability.2 Unjust enrichment offers a good explanation of the vast
majority of indemnity and contribution cases, and it is consistent
with salient features of the mechanics of the remedy: in particular,
the fact that a claim to indemnity or contribution is almost
universally treated for limitations purposes as an action in quasi
contract.3
* Professor of Law, Boston University.
1. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B cmt. c (1979)
("The basis for indemnity is restitution, and the concept that one person is
unjustly enriched at the expense of another when the other discharges liability
that it should be his responsibility to pay."); see also 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES § 4.3(4), at 607-08 (2d ed. 1993); 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF
RESTITUTION § 1.5(d), at 29-33 (1978). The general topic would seem to be a
natural for law school courses on Remedies, but I could find only two
textbooks whose current editions even mention it. See JAMES M. FISCHER,
UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 57[c], at 342 (1999) ("[I]ndemnity is ... a form
of restitution... developed.., to prevent unjust enrichment."); DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 710 (3d
ed. 2002) (stating that indemnity and contribution are restitutionary remedies).
2. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
25 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
3. See Maurie T. Brunner, Annotation, What Statute of Limitations Covers
Actions for Indemnity, 57 A.L.R.3d 833 (1974 & Supp. 2001); Maurie T.
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A full answer is more complicated, however, because there is a
limited but significant set of cases in which courts have allowed A to
recover noncontractual indemnity or contribution even though C
obtained no benefit whatever from A's payment to B. This will be
the case when C, despite having participated in some way in the acts
giving rise to B's claims, is himself under no liability to B. For
example, the statute of limitations may bar B's potential claim
against C by the time A's claim to indemnity would otherwise
accrue. C may be immune to suit by B as a result of the parties'
status: if B and C are married, for example, or if C is B's employer
and B's claims are covered by worker's compensation, or if B and C
made an enforceable agreement by which B exculpates C or limits
C's liability to B.
Courts facing these obstacles sometimes allow A to claim
indemnity or contribution anyway. (It is customary to explain such a
judgment by observing that A's claim against C is independent of B's
underlying claim against C-though in context this is at best a half-
truth.) Whatever the theory of indemnity or contribution is in such
cases, it is not based on restitution. The object of the present note is
to consider what else it might be. The cases offered as examples
come disproportionately from New York, where the judicial attitude
toward apportionment of responsibility has been especially open-
minded. The point of the following discussion is not to conduct a
survey, or to compare jurisdictions, but to argue for the abstract
interest of a question that does not get the attention it deserves.
If C's liability to indemnify A can be put on the basis of a
contract between A and C, express or implied, the lack of any benefit
to C is obviously not a problem. 4 If A's claim to contribution from C
is held to be authorized by statute, the answer is the same-however
unpersuasive it may be as a matter of statutory construction. 5 That
Brunner, Annotation, What Statute of Limitations Applies to Action for
Contribution Against Joint Tory'easer, 57 A.L.R.3d 927 (1974 & Supp. 2001).
4. Implied contract is probably the best explanation of indemnity between
principal and agent, or between the maker of a promissory note and his
accommodation party; likewise, of contribution between partners, or between
co-sureties.
5. Statutes granting a right to contribution usually define an obligation
between parties who are jointly and severally liable to a third. See UNIFORM
CONTRIBUTIONS AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § l(a) cmt. a, 12 U.L.A. 194
(revised 1955) (noting in official comment that the statute's applicability to
"two or more persons.., jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury"
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leaves the decisions that are the subject of this note: those that hold
C liable to A-despite the fact that C was under no liability to B-
without relying on either contract or statute. There are three basic
paths to this result. Briefly, they are (1) the idea that we can finesse
the problem by reinterpreting or rewriting the statute of limitations;
(2) the idea that C's liability to A in indemnity or contribution is
actually (or at least corresponds to) a liability in tort; and (3) the idea
that C's liability to A is simply a matter of equity and fairness. The
last solution is the most interesting of the three, because it suggests a
source of private civil liability that is without parallel in our legal
system. If these decisions correctly state the law, we will have to
revise our categories before we can describe them.
If and to the extent that noncontractual indemnity or
contribution is based on C's unjust enrichment at the expense of A, it
is axiomatic that C can have no liability to A exceeding what would
have been C's liability to B, absent A's intervention. Such is
certainly the usual understanding. Some recent cases sum up this
proposition with the rule of thumb that there can be "no indemnity
without liability"--meaning, in this context, no indemnity obligation
of C to A exceeding C's potential liability to B.6 The current draft of
the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment makes
this limitation explicit,7 and on this point it is consistent with other
modern restatements.
8
has been "adequate to exclude cases where the person from whom contribution
is sought was not liable to the injured person."); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1401
(McKinney 1997 & Supp. 2002) (contribution between "two or more persons
who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury"). Such a
statute by its terms gives A no claim in contribution against C if C is not also
liable to B.
6. See, e.g., Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp.,
8 Cal. 4th 100, 114-16, 876 P.2d 1062, 1072, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 271 (1994)
(referring to "the fundamental principle that 'there can be no indemnity
without liability"' in holding that C's liability to A could not exceed the limit,
fixed by statute, of C's underlying liability to B).
7. See RESTATEMENT (THnRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 25 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) (noting that "there can be liability in
restitution only to the extent that the claimant's intervention has reduced or
discharged an enforceable legal obligation of the defendant").
8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
§§ 22 cmt. c, 23 cmt. j (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A
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By contrast, a lawyer who tries to locate this basic proposition in
the 1937 Restatement of the Law of Restitution will not find it right
away. Warren Seavey and Austin Scott summarized the general rule
of indemnity as follows:
A person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty
which is owed by him but which as between himself and
another should have been discharged by the other, is
entitled to indemnity from the other, unless the payor is
barred by the wrongful nature of his conduct.
9
So stated, the rule omits the basic requirement of restitution-based
indemnity: namely, that the parties begin as joint obligors. Taken at
face value and out of context, section 76 can thus be read as an
independent, open-ended, and free-standing authorization of
indemnity to any person who can allege that he has paid a debt that
"as between himself and another should have been discharged by the
other"--with no apparent limitation on the content of the "should
have."
Of course, it is anachronistic to suppose that Seavey and Scott
might have entertained any such conception in 1937. They chose the
broad language of section 76 because they had decided to restate the
law of indemnity and contribution generally, instead of describing
those remedies only insofar as they were authorized by principles of
unjust enrichment. Section 76 was thus designed to accommodate all
possible sources of the obligation to indemnify, including those that
are not based on restitution at all:
In other cases,. . . the payor does not discharge a duty owed
by the other... and hence he confers no benefit upon the
other. In such cases indemnity or contribution is granted, if
at all, only because of a contractual or other relation
between the parties, or because the other has committed a
breach of duty to the payor. With these latter situations in
which the payor confers no benefit upon the other and in
which, therefore, liability is based upon a breach of a
contractual or relational duty or upon the commission of a
cmt. g ("If the one from whom contribution is sought is not in fact liable to the
injured person, he is not liable for contribution.").
9. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 76 (1937).
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tort, the Restatement of this Subject is not directly
concerned .... 10
The wording of the old Restatement is pertinent to our general
inquiry because, as we shall see, some recent decisions cite section
76 as though it authorized indemnity purely on the basis of the
"should have," with the rule of the section being glossed as "simple
fairness."" This is a misreading of the original Restatement, but it
provides a convenient way to identify the sort of rule that a few
courts are trying to justify.
In reality, Seavey and Scott assumed (as we see from the
passage just quoted) that the source of the obligation to indemnify-
when not based on restitution-could always be identified with some
recognizable, identifiable, pre-existing obligation owed by C to A.
To paraphrase: "Where A's payment to B confers no benefit upon C,
indemnity or contribution is granted, if at all, only because of a
contractual or other relation between A and C, or because C has
committed a breach of duty to A." Because the "other relation" is
usually one we might analyze as an implied contract-for example,
between principal and agent; between partners; or between the maker
of a note and his accommodation party-the question of
noncontractual liability in indemnity and contribution quickly boils
down to "breach of duty." But what duty is being breached, and
what happens when a breach of duty is no longer a plausible account
of the relations between A and C?
I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Sometimes A obtains indemnity or contribution from C,
notwithstanding the lack of a contract between them and the absence
of any ostensible benefit to C, because the court decides it can do
justice simply by manipulating the statute of limitations. Suppose
that A and C, strangers to each other, have violated independent
duties to B in a way that would make them jointly and severally
liable for B's injuries. Shortly before B's claims will be barred by
the statute of limitations, B sues A but not C. Before A even has a
reasonable opportunity to assert a cross-claim for contribution
against C-and years before B's claim against A is reduced to
10. Id., ch. 3, Topic 3, Introductory Note, at 330.
11. See infra text accompanying note 29.
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judgment, settled, or paid-B's direct claim against C is time-barred.
Modem courts, strongly inclined to apportion liability between
responsible parties, find it intolerable that an equitable
apportionment should be frustrated because of B's choice of when
(and whom) to sue. They rescue A's contribution claim by repeating
that A's claim against C is "entirely independent" of B's direct claim
against C; moreover, that A's claim in indemnity or contribution only
accrues when A pays B. A's claim against C cannot be prescribed
before it accrues, so A's claim is not time-barred.1
2
But while the limitations problem can certainly be solved,
whether by legislation or by judicial fiat, allowing C's contribution
claim to proceed merely confronts us with the problem with which
we began. If A pays B after B has sued C (or at a time when B could
still sue C), the consensus of courts and restatements alike is that A's
claim against C is a species of restitution for unjust enrichment. The
same authorities agree that the prescription of B's direct claims
against C must not be allowed to foreclose A's claim for
contribution. Yet A's payment to B confers no benefit on C, if B's
direct claim against C is time-barred when A's payment is made.
The problem is not limitations, but the need to identify a different
rationale for A's cause of action. Certainly it seems anomalous that
the source of liability for contribution should be understood to be
restitution in the normal case-one in which all parties have been
timely joined-yet something else entirely, if the same claims
between the same parties are asserted after more time has elapsed.
II. INDEPENDENT DUTY
Even if the difficulties presented by the statute of limitations
may be brushed aside, a further set of cases presents the same
problem in more intractable form: those in which C is not liable to B
because of an effective contractual or legal limitation of liability.
Traditional cases on this pattern include those in which B and C are
husband and wife; or in which C is B's employer, and B's injury is
12. For a thoughtful judicial opinion reaching this conclusion, see Koonce
v. Quaker Safety Products & Mfg. Co., 798 F.2d 700, 705-15 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Garwood, J.). The torts restatements approve the outcome, though without
explaining how it is to be justified. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILrrY §§ 22 cmt. d, 23 cmt. k (2000); cf
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. g (acknowledging that "[t]he
statute of limitations may offer some difficulty").
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covered by worker's compensation which (by statute) constitutes B's
exclusive remedy against C. There is a significant conflict between
rules and policies that limit C's liability to B, on the one hand, and
rules and policies that favor apportionment of liability between A and
C, on the other, and outcomes-not surprisingly-diverge. What is
clear is that C's liability to A in such a case cannot be based on
unjust enrichment. The usual way out of this impasse, for a court
that wants to allow A to recover from C, is to say that A's claim is
not based on unjust enrichment at all, but on C's breach of an
independent duty owed by C to A. Contribution and indemnity thus
become tort instead of restitution. The consequence is that we no
longer have to explain how C obtained any benefit from A's
payment. On the other hand, we will now have to find that C has
breached a duty to A-consistent with recognizable principles of
liability in tort.
The "independent duty" approach got its start in cases where it
offered a thoroughly plausible explanation of liability. There are
circumstances in which C's wrongful behavior, though creating no
liability to B, nevertheless constitutes a tort independently actionable
by A. For example, in the 1938 case of Westchester Lighting v.
Westchester County Small Estates Corporation'3 -still cited by the
New York courts to illustrate the "independent duty" principle-
employees of C, engaged in building a drain, negligently broke a gas
line belonging to A, the local gas company, then negligently repaired
the damage they had done. Gas continued to leak and asphyxiated B,
another employee of C. B's estate sued A, alleging that A's delay in
discovering the leak had contributed to B's death. The worker's
compensation statute barred any claim by the estate against C. A
sought indemnity from C. The Court of Appeals allowed the claim,
reasoning that A "asserts its own right of recovery for breach of an
alleged independent duty or obligation owed to it by [C].' 14 When
the "independent duty" is this obvious, the logic is unexceptionable.
To reach the result in a case of this kind it is enough to accept that
A's tort claim against C may include, as indirect damages, amounts
for which A has become liable to B as a result of C's wrong to A.
Predictably, a court that is more interested in the apportionment
of liability than in the policies underlying the various sources of legal
13. 15 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1938).
14. Id. at 568.
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immunity will eventually find itself enforcing "independent duties"
at the outer limits of tort law, or even beyond. In Garrett v. Holiday
Inns, Inc., 15 B had been killed in a motel fire. The premises, owned
and operated by A, were located in the Town of C. B's estate sued
both A and C for wrongful death: the plaintiff's theory against C was
that C had failed to enforce its own fire and safety regulations against
A. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs claim
against C, on the ground that C owed no duty to B other than "a
general duty owed by the town to the public at large," the breach of
which was not actionable. 16 When the case continued against A, A
sought contribution from C on the theory that C's failure to enforce
fire and safety regulations against A was a breach of C's independent
duty to A. A majority of the Court of Appeals agreed. While C
owed no "special duty" to members of the public killed in the fire, it
might be shown to owe such a duty to the owners and operators of
the premises, whose wrongful conduct C might have prevented.17
It may be that a decision as tendentious as that in Garrett no
longer tells us anything meaningful about the nature of the liability
being enforced, given that-as seems evident-the Court of Appeals
could not have cared less why C was liable to A for contribution. In
another sense, however, a court's readiness to put all the problematic
instances of indemnity and contribution on the ground of
"independent duty" may still be significant for our analysis of the
problem. So long as the doubtful cases are all instances of
"independent duty," then-whether or not the court's reasoning is
persuasive in a particular instance-the difficulties are a matter of
local tort law. If liability for indemnity or contribution in New York
(or anywhere else) sometimes appears arbitrary, unpredictable, or
difficult to describe within regular contours, the conclusion is merely
that tort liability in that jurisdiction includes some extenuated duties,
some remote causes, and some unforeseeable plaintiffs. So long as
C's liability to A is explained by C's breach of an "independent
duty," in other words, there is no need to break new ground with any
truly radical explanations of liability for indemnity and contribution.
(A truly radical explanation would be, for example, that A has
15. 447 N.E.2d 717 (N.Y. 1983).
16. Id. at 719.
17. See id. at 721-22 n.5.
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discharged a duty that "in simple fairness" should have been
discharged by C.)
III. SIMPLE FAIRNESS
This is why the most interesting decisions are those in which
courts have allowed indemnity or contribution in the absence of a
contract between A and C, in the absence of benefit to C, and without
any assertion that C breached an independent duty to A.
Sommer v. Federal Signal Corporation18 considered claims and
cross-claims arising out of a fire causing damage to an office
building. B in this case was the building owner, 810 Associates
("810"). A was an array of parties connected with B's fire alarm
system-"designers, manufacturers, parts suppliers, installers,
inspectors"--known collectively as the "alarm defendants." C was
Holmes Protection Inc., a fire alarm monitoring service under
contract to B, whose job it was to call the fire department. Holmes
was in a separate category from the other defendants because its
contract with 810 contained an exculpatory clause excluding liability
for its negligent performance. 19 Summary judgment in favor of
Holmes was reversed by the Appellate Division, on the ground that
Holmes could not by contract escape liability for gross negligence or
recklessness; whether its conduct met that standard was a question
for the jury. It followed, moreover, that Holmes would be liable to
the alarm defendants on their claim for contribution, if its liability to
810 were established.
The disposition of the contribution claim in the Appellate
Division is consistent with traditional analysis in terms of restitution.
C is liable to A to the extent that A pays a claim for which C would
have been liable to B. This meant, on the facts of Sommer, that the
alarm defendants could seek contribution only if Holmes were shown
to have been grossly negligent or reckless. Yet the facts made it
entirely possible, perhaps even probable, that a jury would find
Holmes guilty of no more than ordinary negligence. The Court of
Appeals was unwilling to accept that Holmes, relying on the
exculpatory clause of its contract, might avoid the liability for
contribution to which it would have been subject in the absence of
18. 79 N.Y.2d 540, 593 N.E.2d 1365 (1992).
19. See id. at 549-50, 593 N.E. at 1368.
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the clause. Sommer is interesting because it allows A to claim
contribution from C when there is manifestly neither a contract, nor a
benefit conferred, nor a breach of "independent duty," between A and
C.
This revolution in the apportionment of liability is accomplished
by means of a discussion that elides the critical distinctions. In an
attempt to clarify what is going on here-and at the risk of appearing
officious-I interpolate my own commentary in bracketed italics:
As we noted in Rogers v. Dorchester Assocs. (32 NY2d
553, 564): "The rule of apportionment applies when two or
more tort-feasors have shared, albeit in various degrees, in
the responsibility by their conduct or omissions in causing
an accident, in violation of the duties they respectively
owed to the injured person."
That Holmes owed no duty to the alarm defendants is thus
immaterial if it breached a duty it owed to the injured
person-plaintiff 810-and thereby contributed to 810's
injury. [C's lack of duty to A is indeed immaterial, so long
as contribution is based on C's enrichment at the expense
of A.] In that we have concluded Holmes did owe such a
duty, plainly the alarm defendants may seek contribution
from Holmes. [But not on restitution grounds, unless
Holmes is legally liable to the plaintiff]
The question remains whether contribution is activated
only upon a finding that Holmes was grossly negligent (as
the Appellate Division concluded) or whether a finding of
ordinary negligence would suffice.
In contribution cases, we have drawn a distinction
between the absence of liability to an injured party, and the
absence of a duty (see, e.g., Garrett v Holiday Inns, 58
NY2d 253, 259). [The distinction between C's "liability"
to B and C's "duty" to B is meaningless, if the question is
C's unjust enrichment at the expense of A. In Garrett, as
previously noted, liability for contribution was explicitly
founded on the breach of an independent duty owed by C to
A.] Often, the absence of direct liability to plaintiff is
merely the result of a special defense, such as the Statute of
Limitations or the exclusivity of workers' compensation,
and not because defendant was free of fault. In such cases,
INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION
we have held that codefendants may seek contribution from
the joint wrongdoer, despite the wrongdoer's own defense
to plaintiffs claim. [But the result in such cases has
heretofore been justified on the basis of C's breach of C's
independent duty to A.] This principle is fully in accord
with the rationale of [contribution between joint
tortfeasors], which promotes equitable distribution of the
loss in proportion to actual fault.
To the extent Holmes' exculpatory clause insulates it
from liability for ordinary negligence, we view it as akin to
a special defense that does not affect the codefendants'
ability to obtain contribution. Although Holmes' direct
liability to 810 (by virtue of the exculpatory clause) is
triggered only upon gross negligence, its duty is to avoid
ordinary negligence. Upon breach of that duty, fairness
requires that Holmes contribute to the judgment in
proportion to its culpability. Indeed, it would be patently
unfair to abrogate the alarm-related defendants' right to
contribution based on an exculpatory clause to which they
were not a party.
20
The court is unconcerned with, and may be oblivious to, the
analytical distinctions that its opinion ignores. To insist on the
difference between liabilities based on contract, on tort, and on
unjust enrichment may seem antiquated and fussy-and irrelevant, if
the outcome (C's liability to A for contribution) is always the same.
But unless we distinguish the different grounds of apportioning
liability, it is impossible to appreciate the significance of what the
Court of Appeals has here proposed.
There are at least two large-scale explanations of what the court
does in Sommer, not inconsistent with each other, both of them
interesting. The first emphasizes the fact that C's immunity in this
case was the result of an exculpatory clause in C's contract with B.
After the decision in Sommer, Holmes is left in precisely the same
position that it would have occupied if the relevant contractual
provision had never been written. Indeed, this seems to be the
immediate point of the exercise. The court believes that "it would be
patently unfair to abrogate [A's] right to contribution based on an
20. Id. at 557-58, 593 N.E.2d at 1373 (some citations omitted).
Winter 2003]
938 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:927
exculpatory clause [in the contract between B and C] to which [A
was] not a party., 21 This amounts to saying that, in a regime that
seeks to allocate liability for harm according to fault, a contract that
limits C's liability to B is unenforceable, as against public policy, to
the extent that it interferes with what would otherwise be A's rights
of contribution or indemnity against C. The difficulty is to decide
the proper limits of this reasoning, because the possibility of limiting
liability by contract-leaving aside any inquiry into the benefits
society might derive from that possibility-is only one of countless
legal obstacles to a perfect apportionment of liability according to
fault. How many of them is the Court of Appeals planning to
uproot? To mention only the most obvious example, by the
reasoning of Sommer it is also "patently unfair" if C is allowed to
shield himself from liability to A by obtaining a release from B as
part of a favorable settlement-in effect, an "exculpatory clause to
which [A is] not a party." But the settling tortfeasor is not yet liable
for contribution in New York or anywhere else.22
But it is the second point about Sommer that is relevant to our
inquiry: the New York court's identification of the source of C's
liability to A. Plainly it is not contract or restitution, and the court
makes a point of saying that it is not an "independent duty" either:
"Holmes did not have a duty... to the alarm defendants." 23 That
seems to leave "fairness" as the basis of liability, as the court
concludes that "fairness requires that Holmes contribute to the
judgment in proportion to its culpability.
'" 24
21. Id.
22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
§§ 23 cmt. i, 24 cmt. e (2000). In New York, the settling tortfeasor's immunity
from contribution is guaranteed by statute. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW. § 15-
108(b) (McKinney 2002). The New York statute includes a claim-reduction
provision. One consequence of B's release of joint tortfeasor C is accordingly
that B's remaining claim against joint tortfeasor A is reduced by the "amount
stipulated" in the release, by "the amount of the consideration paid for it," or
"in the amount of [C's] equitable share of the damages ... whichever is the
greatest." Id. § 15-108(a). The Court of Appeals might have decided Sommer
in a manner consistent with New York's statutory scheme for contribution and
apportionment by holding that 810's claim against the alarm defendants was
reduced by the equitable share of the damages attributable to Holmes's
ordinary negligence-treating the exculpatory clause in the Holmes contract,
for purposes of apportionment, as the equivalent of the release.
23. Sommer, 593 N.E.2d at 1374.
24. Id. at 1373.
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Fairness appears in some other New York decisions as the basis
of a hard-to-explain liability in indemnity or contribution. One
recent example is the lead-paint case, in which the City of New York
sought indemnification from paint manufacturers for the cost of
remedial measures taken by the City-in response to a command of
the New York legislature-to abate lead hazards in City-owned
apartment buildings.2 5  Restitution was not a plausible basis of
indemnity in this case, because it seemed unlikely that the
manufacturers would be found to be under a pre-existing liability to
anyone: the City's ownproducts-liability claims had been dismissed
on limitations grounds.2T "Independent duty" was harder than usual
to visualize on these facts, considering that the paint had been sold
(to previous owners of the buildings) long before the City was
required, by statute, to undertake remediation. 27  Given these
difficulties with the alternative grounds of liability, the holding that
the City had stated a valid claim for indemnity against the
manufacturers appears to rest substantially on the court's observation
that "[a]n implied indemnity action is based upon the law's notion of
what is fair and proper between the parties" 28-- treating the law's
notion of what is fair and proper as nothing less than a substantive
basis of liability.
In an earlier, much-cited decision, the Court of Appeals had
suggested that the City's indemnity claim against the manufacturer
of a garbage truck-for injuries suffered by a municipal employee-
was based on "simple fairness":
It is nothing short of simple fairness to recognize that "[a]
person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty
which is owed by him but which as between himself and
another should have been discharged by the other, is
entitled to indemnity" (Restatement, Restitution, § 76). To
prevent unjust enrichment, courts have assumed the duty of
placing the obligation where in equity it belongs.
29
25. City of New York v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 644 N.Y.S.2d 919 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996).
26. See id. at 921. A claim that the manufacturers had fraudulently
misrepresented the safety of their products was allowed to proceed.
27. See id. at 923-25.
28. Id. at 925.
29. McDermott v. City of New York, 406 N.E.2d 460, 462 (N.Y. 1980).
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Indemnity in the case of the garbage truck was not in restitution,
however, because the employee's claims against the manufacturer
were time-barred years before the City thought to assert a cross-
claim for indemnity. There had once been an "independent duty" on
the part of the manufacturer to the City, but both the nature and the
normal limits of this duty, under the circumstances, were all too
obvious. The City had purchased the truck from the manufacturer,
but its claim to indemnity was asserted only after its claims derived
from the sale transaction (whether in tort or on the seller's
warranties) were also time-barred. These problems with the
alternatives tend to support the conclusion that the basis of indemnity
was indeed, as the court suggested, "simple fairness." Certainly
there was no indication that a liability in indemnity required any
additional justification.
When all other explanations fail-no contract between the
parties, no benefit conferred, no identifiable "independent duty"-
some courts have been willing to allow A to obtain indemnity or
contribution from C on the basis of "simple fairness" alone. Some of
the decisions say this in so many words, or almost. A judicial
tendency to blur the distinctions between the various rationales
makes it harder to pin down the source of the liability in a particular
case, but the conclusion is facilitated to the extent that we can
logically eliminate the other possible sources of liability.
If my reading of the cases is correct, the remedies of indemnity
and contribution furnish a context in which some American courts
have been willing to enforce a legal obligation that will not be found
in any law book. They have held that one person may be under a
legal obligation to pay money to another because simple fairness
(and nothing else) requires him to do so.
In countless cases, to be sure, a judge's conviction about the
requirements of simple fairness helps to explain the judicial
conclusion that a promise has been made and broken, a duty
breached, or a benefit conferred. That much is perfectly obvious.
What is unique and interesting about the indemnity and contribution
cases is that some of them really do appear to be based on fairness
alone, because the recognized sources of civil liability can all be
logically eliminated.
INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION
If the courts impose liability that generally recognized legal
principles cannot explain, there are two possibilities. One is that the
decisions are wrong. (These cases would certainly be decided
differently in the jurisdictions that say, "No indemnity without
liability.") The other is that our account of the sources of civil
liability is incomplete. Expanding it to accommodate the liability of
C to A in a case like Sommer might proceed along various lines, but
there seem to be two obvious choices. One is to extend our
description of tort liability to include some injuries that, by
traditional rules, would be regarded as remote and unforeseeable.
The other is to say that, in a proper case, a person under no other
recognized legal obligation may still be required to do what is fair.
Something like the second idea is what many people mistakenly
expect to find in the law of restitution and unjust enrichment. Some
more sophisticated commentators, recognizing that our law
acknowledges no such rule, argue that we should find a place for it
somewhere-under the heading of "restitution" or any other that
might fit.30 Marginal cases in indemnity and contribution reveal that
a liability rule based avowedly on simple fairness may already exist.
Whether recognition of such a rule represents the elevation or the
abandonment of legal principle remains a question of jurisprudential
taste.
30. Compare Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and
Reliance, Contracts and Torts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695 (arguing for the
necessity of interstitial liability rules to avoid unfairness), with Emily Sherwin,
Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79
TEX. L. REV. 2083 (2001) (responding that such rules are not properly found in
the law of restitution).
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